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A new generic digital signature algorithm
Jennifer Seberry, Vinhbuu To and Dongvu Tonien
Abstract. In this paper, we study two digital signature algorithms, the DSA and ECDSA,
which have become NIST standard and have been widely used in almost all commercial
applications. We will show that the two algorithms are actually ‘the same’ algebraically
and propose a generic algorithm such that both DSA and ECDSA are instances of it. By
looking at this special angle through the generic algorithm, we gain a new insight into
the two algorithms DSA and ECDSA. Our new proposed digital signature algorithm is
described generically using a group G and a map toNumber W G ! Z. As an illustration,
we chooseG to be a group of non-singular circulant matrices over finite field and describe
a totally new concrete digital signature algorithm.
Keywords. Digital signature, discrete log problem, circulant matrices group.
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1 Introduction
A digital signature algorithm is a public key cryptographic algorithm designed to
protect the authenticity of a digital message or document. A message is signed by
a secret key to produce a signature and the signature is verified against the message
by a public key. Thus any party can verify the signatures but only one party with
the secret key can sign the messages. A valid digital signature gives a recipient
reason to believe that the message was created by a known sender who possesses
the secret key, and that it was not altered in transit.
Digital signatures are used widely in e-commerce applications, in banking ap-
plications, in software distribution, and in other cases where jurisdiction is in-
volved and it is important to detect forgery or tampering. Thus it is crucial to
use algorithms that have been standardized by government organizations. Even
though there are a numerous number of digital signature algorithms in research
literature, only three algorithms have been standardized by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) and have been widely used in almost all
commercial applications. These are the RSA, the DSA and the ECDSA [1, 3].
The RSA was invented by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman, and the security of
the algorithm is based on the hardness of factoring a product of two large prime
numbers. The DSA was proposed by NIST and attributed to Kravitz, a former
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NSA employee. The security of the DSA is based on the hardness of the discrete
log problem on the multiplicative group of units on the finite field Fp. The ECDSA
is the elliptic curve analogous of the DSA and its security is based on the discrete
log problem on the group of points on elliptic curve over a finite field.
In this paper, we study the DSA and ECDSA. Our goal is to find a common
algebraic structure between the two algorithms. We show that the two algorithms
are actually ‘the same’ algebraically. We will propose a generic algorithm that
captures the common algebraic structure of these two algorithms.
DSA and ECDSA have been standardized and widely used in real world appli-
cations. Their securities have been attested by the cryptographic community for
almost two decades. It is reasonable to believe that our new DSA-based generic
algorithm is secure. In Section 5, we will give a proof of the correctness of the
generic algorithm and show that the security of the algorithm is based on the hard-
ness of the discrete log problem in the underlined group.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give some math-
ematical preliminaries and notation. In Section 3, we compare the two algorithms
DSA and ECDSA and derive their algebraic similarity. The new generic algorithm
will be described in Section 4 and an example is given in Section 6. In this ex-
ample, we will use a group of circulant matrices and describe a concrete digital
signature algorithm.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Groups
We recall that a group is a special algebraic structure that consists of a set G with
a binary operation  W G  G ! G , .a; b/ 7! a  b, that satisfies three conditions:
(1) there is a special element e called the identity such that a  e D e  a D a for
any group element a, (2) for each group element a, there is a group element a 1,
called the inverse of a, such that a  a 1 D a 1  a D e, and (3) the operation is
associative, that is a  .b  c/ D .a  b/  c for any group elements a, b and c.
For an integer n and a group element a, we define the power an as an D a 
a      a (n times). If the group is commutative, people often use C for the
group operation and 0 for the identity element. In this additive notation, the power
function is aCaC  Ca D na. In this paper, we will discuss algebraic properties
generically, we are going to prototype group operations as in modern programming
language as follows:
GroupElement multiply(GroupElement a, GroupElement b);
GroupElement inverse(GroupElement a);
GroupElement pow(GroupElement a, Integer n);
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The correctness proofs of the DSA, ECDSA and our new algorithm are based
on the following classical theorem.
Theorem 2.1 (Lagrange’s theorem). In a finite group G , for any group element a,
pow.a; jG j/ is equal to the identity element.
The discrete log problem in a group G is stated as follows: given two group
elements a and b D pow.a; x/, find the number x. In DSA and ECDSA, we need
to use groups such that the discrete log problem is hard. This is because in these
algorithms, the attacker knows the two group elements g and y. The element g is
the group generator and is specified in the group parameters. The element y is the
public key. Both g and y are made public and anyone will know these values. The
secret key is the number x and we have y D pow.g; x/. If the discrete log problem
is not hard then from g and y, anyone can solve the discrete log problem to obtain
the secret key x.
2.2 Fiber sets and fiber-skew functions
For a function f W A! B and y 2 B , the fiber set Fy is defined as
Fy D ¹x 2 A W f .x/ D yº:
Fy is the set of all elements of A that are mapped to y in B .
The domain A is partitioned into the fiber sets Fy . If A and B are finite sets
then the size of the fiber set Fy reflects the probability PrŒx W f .x/ D y. Indeed,
PrŒx W f .x/ D y D
jFy j
jAj
:
If f W A ! B is a random function then each y 2 B will have an equal
probability for f .x/ D y. It means that all the fiber sets Fy have approximately
the same size and jFy j  jAj=jBj. On the other hand, if there is a fiber set
Fy that has a relatively larger size then with this particular value of y, there is a
larger probability that f .x/ D y. In this case, we call the function f a skew-fiber
function.
AUTHOR’S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 
AUTHOR’S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 
4 J. Seberry, V. To and D. Tonien
To measure how skew a function is, we may use the quantity
˛ D
max.jFy j/
jAj
D max
y2B
 
PrŒx W f .x/ D y

:
Then ˛ 2 Œ1=jBj; 1 and the larger the ˛ value the more skew a function is. In
this sense, a random function is a least skew function with ˛ D 1=jBj. A constant
function is a most skew function with ˛ D 1. In a constant function, one fiber set
is equal to the whole set B whereas other fiber sets are empty.
We will see later that in our new generic algorithm, one of our security require-
ments is that the function toNumbern W G ! Zn is not a skew-fiber function. This
requirement means that for each i 2 Zn, the probability that toNumbern.g/ D i is
negligible, or equivalently, all the fiber sets have roughly similar size and no fiber
set has a larger size.
3 Comparison between DSA and ECDSA
In this section, we will compare the two algorithms DSA and ECDSA. We will
look at DSA and ECDSA step by step in details.
Domain parameters setup.
DSA setup ECDSA setup
p is a prime, q is a prime divisor of
p   1.
E.Fq/ is an elliptic curve over the field
Fq .
g is an element of order q in .F p ;/. G is an element of prime order n in
.E.Fq/;C/.
Domain parameters: p, q, g. Domain parameters: E.Fq/, n, G.
We can see that in the setup phase, the aim in both DSA and ECDSA is to set
up a group .G ;/ such that the discrete log problem is hard.
In DSA, G is the subgroup of .F p ;/ generated by the element g of order q:
G D hgi D ¹1; g; g2; : : : ; gq 1º;
and the group operation  is the multiplication modulo p.
In ECDSA, G is the subgroup of .E.Fq/;C/ generated by the element G of
order n:
G D hGi D ¹O; G; 2G; : : : ; .n   1/Gº;
and the group operation  is the elliptic curve point additionC.
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Let us use the following prototyped function in programming language to de-
note the function that returns the order of the group G .
Integer getOrder();
In DSA, getOrder() D q, and in ECDSA, getOrder() D n.
Key generation.
DSA key generation ECDSA key generation
Select a random integer x 2 Œ1; q   1. Select a random integer d 2 Œ1; n   1.
Compute y D gx .mod p/. Compute Q D dG.
The private key is x. The private key is d .
The public key is y. The public key is Q.
The key generation of both DSA and ECDSA can be re-written generically as
follows
Select a random integer x 2 Œ1; getOrder()   1.
Compute y D pow.g; x/.
The private key is x 2 Z.
The public key is y 2 G .
Signature generation.
DSA signature generation ECDSA signature generation
1. Compute e D H.M/. 1. Compute e D H.M/.
2. Select random integer k 2 Œ1; q   1. 2. Select random integer k 2 Œ1; n   1.
3. Compute w D gk .mod p/. 3. Compute W D kG D .x1; y1/.
4. Compute r D w .mod q/. 4. Compute r D x1 .mod n/.
5. Compute s D k 1.eCxr/ .mod q/. 5. Compute s D k 1.eCdr/ .mod n/.
6. The signature for M is .r; s/. 6. The signature for M is .r; s/.
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Signature verification.
DSA signature verification ECDSA signature verification
1. Compute e D H.M/. 1. Compute e D H.M/.
2. Compute z D s 1 .mod q/. 2. Compute z D s 1 .mod n/.
3. Compute u1 D ez .mod q/. 3. Compute u1 D ez .mod n/.
4. Compute u2 D rz .mod q/. 4. Compute u2 D rz .mod n/.
5. Compute v D gu1yu2 .mod p/. 5. Compute V D u1G C u2Q
D .x1; y1/.
6. Compute r 0 D v .mod q/. 6. Compute r 0 D x1 .mod n/.
7. Accept the signature if r 0 D r . 7. Accept the signature if r 0 D r .
We can see that DSA and ECDSA are different in the signature generation and
verification. In signature generation, the difference is in step 4 and in signature
verification, the difference is in step 6.
In order to resolve these differences, we propose to rewrite step 4 in the signa-
ture generation into two steps 4A and 4B. Also in the signature verification, we
will rewrite step 6 into two steps 6A and 6B as follows.
Rewriting signature generation.
DSA signature generation ECDSA signature generation
1. Compute e D H.M/. 1. Compute e D H.M/.
2. Select random integer k 2 Œ1; q   1. 2. Select random integer k 2 Œ1; n   1.
3. Compute w D gk .mod p/. 3. Compute W D kG D .x1; y1/.
4A. Compute t D w. 4A. Compute t D x1.
4B. Compute r D t .mod q/. 4B. Compute r D t .mod n/.
5. Compute s D k 1.eCxr/ .mod q/. 5. Compute s D k 1.eCdr/ .mod n/.
6. The signature for M is .r; s/. 6. The signature for M is .r; s/.
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Rewriting signature verification.
DSA signature verification ECDSA signature verification
1. Compute e D H.M/. 1. Compute e D H.M/.
2. Compute z D s 1 .mod q/. 2. Compute z D s 1 .mod n/.
3. Compute u1 D ez .mod q/. 3. Compute u1 D ez .mod n/.
4. Compute u2 D rz .mod q/. 4. Compute u2 D rz .mod n/.
5. Compute v D gu1yu2 .mod p/. 5. Compute V D u1G C u2Q
D .x1; y1/.
6A. Compute t D v. 6A. Compute t D x1.
6B. Compute r 0 D t .mod q/. 6B. Compute r 0 D t .mod n/.
7. Accept the signature if r 0 D r . 7. Accept the signature if r 0 D r .
We can see that step 4A of the DSA signature generation and step 6A of the
DSA signature verification seem redundant. However, this is the crucial step of
our proposed generic algorithm. An important fact that we want to point out is
that in step 4A of DSA, even t and w have the same value but they are of different
types. The variable w is a group element of G , but the variable t is an integer.
Therefore, step 4A seems redundant but it is not.
To make this point clear, we will introduce the following function
Integer toNumber(GroupElement a);
The function toNumber W G ! Z is a function that maps a group element to an
integer. In DSA, the function toNumber W G ! Z is the trivial identity function
that maps each group element a 2 F p to the number a 2 Œ1; p   1:
Integer toNumber(GroupElement a){
return a;
}
In ECDSA, the function toNumber W G ! Z is the function that maps each group
element a 2 E.Fq/ to the x-coordinate of a:
Integer toNumber(GroupElement a){
write the point as a D .x1; y1/
return x1;
}
With the introduction of the function toNumber W G ! Z, we can see that the
two algorithms DSA and ECDSA are now exactly the same “algebraically”.
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4 Generic algorithm
In this section, we will describe our new generic digital signature algorithm which
is motivated from the two algorithms DSA and ECDSA. This generic algorithm
will use a group .G ;/ such that the discrete log problem is hard.
We will use a function toNumber W G ! Z that maps a group element a 2 G
to an integer:
Integer toNumber(GroupElement a);
We will later show that our generic algorithm is correct and its correctness is
independent of the choice of the group G and the function toNumber W G ! Z.
Below is the description of the generic algorithm.
Setup.
.G ;/ is a cyclic group.
g is a generator of .G ;/.
n is the order of the group .G ;/.
Domain parameters: description of .G ;/, g, n.
Key generation.
Select a random integer x 2 Œ1; n   1.
Compute y D pow.g; x/.
The private key is x 2 Z.
The public key is y 2 G .
Signature generation.
1. Compute e D H.M/.
2. Select a random integer k 2 Œ1; n   1.
3. Compute w D pow.g; k/ 2 G .
4A. Compute t D toNumber.w/ 2 Z.
4B. Compute r D t .mod n/.
5. Compute s D k 1.e C xr/ .mod n/.
6. The signature for M is .r; s/.
Signature verification.
1. Compute e D H.M/.
2. Compute z D s 1 .mod n/.
3. Compute u1 D ez .mod n/.
4. Compute u2 D rz .mod n/.
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5. Compute v D multiply.pow.g; u1/; pow.y; u2// 2 G .
6A. Compute t D toNumber.v/ 2 Z.
6B. Compute r 0 D t .mod n/.
7. Accept the signature if r 0 D r .
5 Security analysis of the generic algorithm
5.1 Proof of correctness
We now prove the correctness of the generic algorithm. We show that if .r; s/
is a signature of a message M generated by the signature generation algorithm
then the signature verification algorithm must accept this signature as valid. This
correctness of the algorithm is independent of the choice of the group G and the
function toNumber W G ! Z.
Theorem 5.1. If .r; s/ is a signature generated by the signature generation algo-
rithm of a message M then there must exist a number k such that
r D toNumber.pow.g; k// .mod n/;
s D k 1.e C xr/ .mod n/;
where e D H.M/ 2 Z.
Theorem 5.2. A valid signature .r; s/ that passes the signature verification algo-
rithm for a message M must satisfy
r D toNumber.pow.g; z.e C xr// .mod n/;
where e D H.M/ 2 Z and z D s 1 .mod n/.
Proof. From the signature verification algorithm, we have
r D t .mod n/ D toNumber.v/ .mod n/
D toNumber.pow.g; u1/; pow.y; u2// .mod n/
D toNumber.pow.g; u1 C xu2// .mod n/
D toNumber.pow.g; z.e C xr/// .mod n/:
The correctness of the digital signature algorithm now follows from Theo-
rem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2. Indeed, by Theorem 5.1, if r and s are generated by
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the signature generation algorithm then s D k 1.e C xr/ .mod n/. Therefore,
z.e C xr/ D k .mod n/, so k D z.e C xr/C nj for some j 2 Z. Thus,
r D toNumber.pow.g; k// .mod n/
D toNumber.pow.g; z.e C xr/C nj // .mod n/
D toNumber.pow.g; z.e C xr/// .mod n/:
The last equality is derived from Lagrange’s theorem which asserts that for any
element g of a finite group G of order n, pow.g; n/ is the identity element of the
group. This shows that .r; s/ is a valid signature for M and the generic algorithm
is correct.
5.2 Secrecy of the private key
The generator g of the group G is specified in the group parameters. The element
y is the public key. So both g and y are made public and anyone knows these
values. The secret key is the number x and we have y D pow.g; x/. Therefore, in
order to keep x secret, the discrete log problem in G must be hard. If the discrete
log problem is not hard then from g and y, anyone can solve the discrete log
problem to obtain the secret key x and subsequently can forge a valid signature of
any message.
5.3 Protection against forgery attack
In order for an attacker to forge a valid signature .r; s/ that passes the signature
verification algorithm, the attacker must generate M , r and s that satisfy the fol-
lowing condition:
r D toNumber.pow.g; z.e C xr// .mod n/;
where e D H.M/ 2 Z and z D s 1 .mod n/.
Since n is a public information, the ability to generate s is equivalent to the
ability to generate z. Therefore, in order to forge a valid signature, the attacker
must be able to generate M , r and z that satisfy the following condition:
r D toNumber..gH.M/yr/z/ .mod n/: (1)
Consider the function toNumber modulo n, which we will denote by toNumbern:
toNumbern W G ! Zn
a 7! toNumber.a/ .mod n/:
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For each i 2 Zn, let Fi denote the fiber set of i , that is
Fi D ¹a 2 G W toNumbern.a/ D iº:
Then the condition (1) is equivalent to .gH.M/yr/z 2 Fr .
Theorem 5.3. If an attacker can forge a valid signature then it can generate M , r
and z such that
.gH.M/yr/z 2 Fr : (2)
The following theorem states four requirements for the group G , the function
toNumber W G ! Z and the hash function H so that the generic algorithm is
secure against forgery attack. Note that our first three requirements are similar to
the ones stated in [5] but they are a bit stronger because we consider them in Zn
instead of Z as in [5].
Theorem 5.4. The following conditions are necessary security conditions for the
generic algorithm:
(i) The discrete log problem in the group G is hard.
(ii) The hash function modulo n (i.e. M 7! H.M/ .mod n/) is a one-way func-
tion.
(iii) The hash function modulo n is a collision-resistant function.
(iv) The function toNumbern is not a fiber-skew function.
Proof. The first condition is the crucial one. If the discrete log problem in the
group G is not hard then the attacker can recover the secret key from the pub-
lic key and forge signature on any message. Alternatively, for any message M ,
the attacker can choose a random group element a and calculate toNumber.a/
.mod n/ D r . This gives a 2 Fr . The attacker then solves the discrete log
problem to find z such that .gH.M/yr/z D a and so .gH.M/yr/z 2 Fr . By
Theorem 5.3, this gives a valid signature on M .
The second condition requires that given a number t , it is hard to find M such
that H.M/ .mod n/ D t . If this is not hard then the attacker can formulate a
valid signature as follows. The attacker will choose random u and v and try to
find M , r , z such that .gH.M/yr/z D guyv 2 Fr . First, the attacker calculates
toNumber.guyv/ .mod n/ D r , this gives guyv 2 Fr . Then the attacker cal-
culates z D vr 1 .mod n/, this gives yv D yrz . Next, the attacker calculates
t D uz 1 .mod n/, this gives gu D gtz . Finally the attacker calculates M by
inverting the hash function modulo n from the equation H.M/ D t .mod n/ and
so .gH.M/yr/z D guyv 2 Fr .
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The third condition requires that it is hard to find two different messagesM1 and
M2 such that H.M1/ D H.M2/ .mod n/ because if two such messages can be
found easily then a valid signature for one message will become a valid signature
for the other.
The last condition requires that no fiber set Fi has a large size. If for example,
there is a number i 2 Zn such that the fiber set Fi is large, then the attacker can
forge a signature as follows. First the attacker will choose a number r 2 Zn such
that Fr is a large set. Then the attacker chooses random M and z, this makes
.gH.M/yr/z a random element of the group G . Since Fr is a large set, the proba-
bility that .gH.M/yr/z belongs to the fiber set Fr is not negligible. Therefore, the
probability that the attacker can form a valid signature is not negligible.
Condition (iv) in Theorem 5.4 is a reasonable condition. In DSA, toNumber
is the identity function, so this condition is satisfied. In ECDSA, the function
toNumber returns the x-coordinate of the elliptic point, so this condition is likely
to be satisfied. Since this condition requires that no fiber set Fr has large size,
for a random group element a, the probability for a 2 Fr is negligible. From the
first three conditions, .gH.M/yr/z is a random group element, so the condition
.gH.M/yr/z 2 Fr in Theorem 5.3 will be satisfied with a negligible probability.
6 DSA based on circulant matrices over finite field
In the previous section, we proposed a generic algorithm that defined over a group
G and a function toNumber W G ! Z. The security requirement is that the discrete
log problem in G is hard. In this section, we choose G to be the group of non-
singular circulant matrices over a finite field. This group has recently been studied
by Mahalanobis [2] and it is believed that in this group the discrete log problem
is hard. With this specific choice of the underlined group, the generic algorithm
gives us a totally new concrete digital signature algorithm.
6.1 Circulant matrices
A dd matrix over a field F is called circulant, if every row except the first row is
a right circular shift of the row above that. An example of a circulant 5 5 matrix
is 0BBBBBB@
c0 c1 c2 c3 c4
c4 c0 c1 c2 c3
c3 c4 c0 c1 c2
c2 c3 c4 c0 c1
c1 c2 c3 c4 c0
1CCCCCCA :
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So a circulant matrix is defined by its first row. We will denote a circulant matrix
C with first row c0; c1; : : : ; cd 1 by C D circ.c0; c1; : : : ; cd 1/. The row-sum
of the matrix C is defined as
rowsum.C / D c0 C c1 C    C cd 1:
LetW D circ.0; 1; 0; : : : ; 0/ be a dd circulant matrix then clearlyW d D I ,
the identity matrix, and any circulant matrix C D circ.c0; c1; : : : ; cd 1/ can be
written as a linear sum of W i as
C D c0I C c1W C c2W
2
C    C cd 1W
d 1:
Since W d D I , the set C of all circulant matrices with matrix addition and
multiplication is isomorphic to the ring of all polynomials F Œx modulo xd   1.
The isomorphism is
{ W C ! F Œx=.xd   1/
C D circ.c0; c1; : : : ; cd 1/ 7! c0 C c1x C c2x
2
C    C cd 1x
d 1:
Example. Consider 5  5 circulant matrices over the field F17. Let
A D circ.2; 7; 3; 4; 2/; and B D circ.5; 1; 6; 4; 1/:
The corresponding polynomials are
{.A/ D 2C 7x C 3x2 C 4x3 C 2x4
{.B/ D 5C x C 6x2 C 4x3 C x4:
We have
{.A/C {.B/ D 7C 8x C 9x2 C 8x3 C 3x4
and
{.A/  {.B/
D 10C 37x C 34x2 C 73x3 C 62x4 C 45x5 C 31x6 C 12x7 C 2x8
D 10C 37x C 34x2 C 73x3 C 62x4 C 45C 31x C 12x2 C 2x3
D 55C 68x C 46x2 C 75x3 C 62x4
D 4C 12x2 C 7x3 C 11x4:
We will verify that
AC B D circ.7; 8; 9; 8; 3/
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and
A  B D circ.4; 0; 12; 7; 11/:
Indeed,
AC B D
0BBBBBB@
2 7 3 4 2
2 2 7 3 4
4 2 2 7 3
3 4 2 2 7
7 3 4 2 2
1CCCCCCAC
0BBBBBB@
5 1 6 4 1
1 5 1 6 4
4 1 5 1 6
6 4 1 5 1
1 6 4 1 5
1CCCCCCA D
0BBBBBB@
7 8 9 8 3
3 7 8 9 8
8 3 7 8 9
9 8 3 7 8
8 9 8 3 7
1CCCCCCA
and
A  B D
0BBBBBB@
2 7 3 4 2
2 2 7 3 4
4 2 2 7 3
3 4 2 2 7
7 3 4 2 2
1CCCCCCA 
0BBBBBB@
5 1 6 4 1
1 5 1 6 4
4 1 5 1 6
6 4 1 5 1
1 6 4 1 5
1CCCCCCA
D
0BBBBBB@
55 68 46 75 62
62 55 68 46 75
75 62 55 68 46
46 75 62 55 68
68 46 75 62 55
1CCCCCCA D
0BBBBBB@
4 0 12 7 11
11 4 0 12 7
7 11 4 0 12
12 7 11 4 0
0 12 7 11 4
1CCCCCCA :
6.2 Discrete log problem for circular matrices
The discrete log problem for circular matrices is stated as follows: given a circular
matrix A of size d  d over the field Fq and a circular matrix B D Ax , find the
exponent x.
Mahalanobis [2] showed that the discrete log problem for circular matrices is as
hard as the discrete log problem in the finite field Fqd 1 if the matrix A is chosen
to satisfy the following five conditions:
 Determinant of A is equal to 1.
 rowsum.A/ D 1.
 The polynomial A
x 1
is irreducible where A is the characteristic polynomial
of A.
 d is a prime number.
 q is primitive modulo d .
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6.3 DSA based on a group of circulant matrices
In this section, we will apply the generic algorithm for a group of circulant matri-
ces. What we obtain is a totally new digital signature algorithm. The underlined
group G is the multiplicative group generated by a circulant matrix A defined over
a field Fq that satisfies a number of conditions described in Section 6.2.
Suppose that n is the multiplicative order of the matrix A, that is An D I . Then
the group G is
G D ¹I; A;A2; : : : ; An 1º:
Note that matrices in G are all circulant matrices.
We will chose an encoding function that maps each field element of Fq to an
integer
encode W Fq ! Z:
For example, when q D p is a prime number then encode.a/ D a .mod p/.
When q D pm then each field element a of Fpm is a polynomial over Fp of degree
less thanm, i.e., a D a0Ca1xC  Cam 1xm 1, where a0; a1; : : : ; am 1 2 Fp.
In this case, we can define encode.a/ to be themN -bit number a0ka1k : : : kam 1
where N is the bit length of p. Here each ai is represented as an N -bit number.
We need to define a function toNumber W G ! Z to use in the generic algo-
rithm. We will use the encoding function to define the function toNumber. There
are many choices for this function toNumber. To illustrate, let us define the func-
tion toNumber as follows:
toNumber W G ! Z
C D circ.c0; c1; : : : ; cd 1/ 7! encode.c0 C c2 C c4 C    C cd 1/:
Note that the above definition makes sense because c0 C c2 C c4 C    C cd 1 is
a field element of Fq and so encode.c0 C c2 C c4 C    C cd 1/ is an integer.
Below is the description of the DSA algorithm based on circulant matrices.
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Set up.
Choose a circulant matrixAD circ.a0; a1; : : : ; ad 1/ of size dd over Fq .
n is the multiplicative order of A.
Domain parameters: description of a0; a1; : : : ; ad 1, n.
Key generation.
Select a random integer x 2 Œ1; n   1.
Compute B D Ax D circ.b0; b1; : : : ; bd 1/.
The private key is x 2 Z.
The public key is b0; b1; : : : ; bd 1.
Signature generation.
Compute e D H.M/.
Select a random integer k 2 Œ1; n   1.
Compute C D Ak D circ.c0; c1; : : : ; cd 1/.
Compute t D encode.c0 C c2 C c4 C    C cd 1/ 2 Z.
Compute r D t .mod n/.
Compute s D k 1.e C xr/ .mod n/.
The signature for M is .r; s/.
Signature verification.
Compute e D H.M/.
Compute z D s 1 .mod n/.
Compute u1 D ez .mod n/.
Compute u2 D rz .mod n/.
Compute V D Au1Bu2 D circ.v0; v1; : : : ; vd 1/.
Compute t D encode.v0 C v2 C v4 C    C vd 1/ 2 Z.
Compute r 0 D t .mod n/.
Accept the signature if r 0 D r .
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